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II.—THE NATURE OF INCOMPATIBILITY.
BY LESLIE J. WALKER.
THE Ontological Argument for the existence of God as stated
by Leibnitz, differs in an important respect from all previoua
statements of it: it is based upon the nature of incompati-
bility. 'We have the idea of God,' Anselm load said, 'as a
Being comprising in Himself all perfections ; therefore, since
existence isa perfection and without it God would not com-
prise all perfections, He must exist.' ' This our idea of God
as comprising in Himself all perfections, is clear and distinct,'
said Descartes, ' hence, since clearness and distinctness is
the criterion of objective validity, God exists.' The con-
clusiveness of these arguments as they stood Leibnitz de-
nied, while at the same time readily granting that he had an
idea of God such as his predecessors had described, and also
that this idea, */ not self-contradictory, must be objectively
valid, since it included as one of its notes ' necessary exist-
ence '. He urged, however, that an essential step in the
argument had been omitted. His illustrious predecessors had
neglected to prove that the attributes of God were compatible.
If God is possible, He certainly exists; but is He possible ?
" The Ontological Argument is not a paralogism, but an
imperfect demonstration, which presupposes something that
it is still necessary to prove to give the argument mathemati-
cal evidence ; namely, it is tacitly supposed that this idea of
the all-great and all-perfect Being is possible, and implies no
contradiction." '
This presupposition Leibnitz set himself to prove. He
begins by defining what he understands by a Being who has
all perfections simpliciter, and then gives his proof of the
compatibility of all simple and positive perfections. " I call
& perfection every simple quality that is positive and absolute
and expresses without any limits whatever it does express.
Now, since such a quality is simple, it is al? • irresolvable or
1
 The I'htiotnpliii ,,f Uihnit-., Huasell, p. -286 (G v.. 419).
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344 LESLIE J. WALKER :
indefinable, for otherwise it will either not be one simple
quality, but an aggregate of several, or, if it is one, it will be
circumscribed by limits and will therefore be conceived by a
negation of further progress, contrary to the hypothesis, for
it is assumed to be purely positive. Hence it is not difficult
to show that all perfections are compatible inter se, or can be
in the same subject. For let there be such a proposition as
A and B are incompatible
(understanding by A and B two such simple forms or perfec-
tions—the same holds if several are assumed at once), it is
obvious that it cannot be proved without a resolution of one
or both of the terms A and B ; for otherwise their nature
would not enter into the reasoning, and the incompatibility
of any other things could be shown just as well as theirs.
But by hypothesis they are irresolvable. Therefore this
proposition cannot be proved concerning them."1
Thus incompatibility, according to Leibnitz, holds only
between positive and negative terms (between A and not-A),
or between a positive idea (A) and some complex idea involv-
ing the negation of the first (B resolvable into B' and not-A).
For we have no immediate and necessary judgment of in-
compatibility, or, as Leibnitz puts it, ' the incompatibility of
A and B is not true per se,' and consequently can be shown
only by a process of reasoning. This reasoning, however,
cannot be synthetic, since the synthesis of two or more ideas
will not reveal their incompatibility unless they have first
been analysed ; hence, it must be analytic. But simpleideas
cannot be analysed, and so ' cannot enter into the reasoning'.
All simple and positive ideas, therefore, most be compatible.
This proof of the compatibility of all simple perfections is
based upon the theory that incompatibility can always be
reduced to contradiction. Mr. Russell, on the other hand,
while conceding that positive and negative ideas are neces-
sarily incompatible, thinks that there may also be incom-
patibility between positive ideas. " Thus a self-contradictory
idea, if it be not a mere negative, such as a non-existent
existent, must always involve a synthetic relation of incom-
patibility between two simple notions. The impossible idea
in Leibnitz's sense, presupposes the idea which is impossible
on account of some synthetic proposition; and conversely,
the possible complex idea is possible on account of a synthetic
proposition asserting the compatibility of its simple constitu-
ents." *
1
 The Philosophy of Ltibintt, Russell, p. 287 (G vii., 261).
»IbiiL, p. 2L
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THE NATUBE OF INCOMPATIBILITY. 345
In Mr. BusseU's opinion, therefore, simple ideas are not
always compatible or ' reconcilable among themselves'. Con-
sequently the legitimacy of their combination in complex
ideas will depend upon ' synthetic relations of compatibility
and incompatibility'. Thus in definition there is always
presupposed " the synthetic proposition that the simple con-
stituents are compatible " ; while, on the other hand, but for
" synthetic relations of incompatibility no negative proposi-
tion would occur "-1 With neither of these statements can I
agree. It seems to me that there is no such thing as a rela-
tion of incompatibility between simple ideas, and that nega-
tion presupposes, not incompatibility, but limitation. And
one way of establishing this opinion in regard to the nature
of simple ideas will be to remove all foundation for these
synthetic relations of incompatibility, by showing that alt
incompatibility can be reduced to contradiction, and this is the
thesis which I shall endeavour to prove.
The points, therefore, which I wish to make, are as
follows : (1) That of compatibility we have immediate know-
ledge through the analysis of the various complex wholes
presented to consciousness; (2) that negation presupposes
individual objects which differ from one another, and that
the negative judgment is primarily our way of expressing
the fact that a quality belonging to one object does not de
facto belong to another ; (3) that belief in positive incompati-
bility is based upon repeated experiences of qualities which
never coexist in the same object, and is thus at first empirical
in nature; (4) but that an examination of these qualities
which de facto are never found together in the same object,,
reveals the further fact that they are mutually contradictory
and so neceuarily incompatible.
In the first place, then, the function of-the intellect is to
apprehend the nature of reality—to reproduce in the indi-
vidual consciousness more or less completely and more or
less adequately the universe of which it iB a part The
human intellect, however, is incapable of apprehending in a
single act the universe as a whole. It has perforce to build
up its knowledge, beginning with the individual. The indi-
vidual is itself complex, indeed; but at first it is presented
as a whole, a unity, a 'thing'. By outline, movement,,
unity of action, we easily distinguish it from the background,
and gradually by comparing it with other things we learn to
analyse it into its qualities or attributes. " Not only must
each object present itself to us integrally before it shells off
> The Philotophy of Lcibnitx, Russell, pp. 20, 21 pauim.
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346 LESLIE J. WALKER:
into its qualities, but the whole scene around us must dis-
engage for us object after object from its still background by
emergence and change; and even our self-detachment from
the world over against us must wait for the start of collision
between the force we issue and that we receive. To confine
ourselves to the simplest case: when a red ivory ball, seen
for the first time, has been withdrawn, it will leave a mental
representation of itself, in which all that it simultaneously
gave us will indistinguishably coexist. Let a white ball
succeed to it; now, and not before, will an attribute detach
itself, and the colour by force of contrast, be shaken into the
foreground."1
Thus, by analysis, we learn that different qualities do in fact
belong to the same object, and from this may legitimately
infer—what is already implicitly recognised—that they can
belong to the same object, or, in other words, that they
are compatible. A posse ad esse valet illatio. Knowledge of
•compatibility thus presupposes nothing beyond the mental
analysis of a concrete whole into its differentiating parts or
qualities.3
Our knowledge of incompatibility stands on a different
footing. Inference from the actual to the possible is valid
a fortiori; but we cannot infer that what is not actual is
impossible. And incompatibility is the impossibility of co-
existence in the same object. Hence the mere absence of
co-existence is strictly no proof of incompatibility.
Before discussing, however, the nature of that incompati-
bility which we believe to hold between certain positive
qualities, it will be well to treat of the incompatibility of
contradictories, since this in our theory is the fundamental
form of incompatibility. Our belief in the incompatibility
of contradictories is expressed in the Principle of Contradic-
tion. How, therefore, and when, we may ask, does belief in
this principle arise ? Is it due to an immediate and necessary
judgment? Or is it—like the ordinary man's belief in the
incompatibility of positive qualities—based merely upon
experience ?
Let us return for a moment to Dr. Martineau's example of
the white and red balls. Suppose that these balls are placed
before us side by side, or, better still, that they are moving
slowly in opposite directions. We shall now distinguish not
merely two colours, but two objects, the one white and the
other red. Suppose, further, that some one removes the balls,
• Martineau, Et*tyx Phil, and TTieol., vol. i., p. 271-2.
1
 Of. F. H. Bradley, Appeamnct ami Reality, p. 569. "As a fact and
given we have in feeling diversity and unity in one whole."
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THE NATURE OF INCOMPATIBILITY. 347
and then places one in our hand without letting us see it.
Something perhaps suggests that it is the white one, and
prompts us to form the judgment: ' This is the white object'.
But, when we look, we find that it is the red one that has
been given to us. Another judgment will now take the place
of the one at first suggested, and we shall say, ' This is not
the white object, but the red one'.
In some way such as this, and at a very early stage in the
child's mental development, I conceive that the negative
judgment arises. The negative judgment is essentially one
in which a suggested predicate is rejected.1 It is doubtless
true, as Mr. Bradley says, that in negation the idea denied
" in every case qualifies an alternative more or less distinct;
And hence nowhere floats absolutely ".-' For instance, if we
assert that ' a square circle does not exist,' ' existence' is
•certainly a possible predicate of reality; and so is ' possibility'
if we change the form of our proposition and say that ' a
square circle is impossible'. But the essential characteristic
of the negative judgment is its rejection of a suggested predi-
cate. And this rejection is possible only because objects are
limited, and have not the predicates which are suggested as
belonging to them.
The negative judgment, moreover, always involves an
implicit recognition of the Principle of Contradiction. Nega-
tion would be meaningless if this were not the case. When
we say ' This object is not white' we imply that the corre-
sponding affirmative must be false. The law that contradic-
tories are incompatible is essential to the intelligent use of
negation. Thus even a child, when it forms a negative
judgment, may be said implicitly to recognise the validity of
this fundamental principle of thought. For, though the child
would probably not understand an explicit formulation, since
this would presuppose considerable development in its powers
of abstraction, yet it can hardly be said in no sense to under-
stand a principle which it actually uses and without which its
judgments would be meaningless.
Whether, then, we say that ' the same thing cannot at the
same time be and not be', or that ' affirmation and denial are
1
 Plato's statement in the ' Sophistes' that, when we speak of not-
being, "we speak not of something opposed to being, bat only different"
would seem to identify negation with ' otherness '. And it is true in one
sense that " the not-beautuul is the contrast of being with being," since the
not-beautiful has a positive implication. But the primary and essential
meaning of the not-oeaatifnl is the negation of beauty. Negation may
involve otherness, but the two ideas are not identical.1F. H. Bradley, ' On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary,' MIND, N.8., 60,
p. 449.
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incompatible,' the law of thought thus formulated has all the
marks of a self-evident truth. In either form it compels our
assent; it is involved in one of the fundamental forms of
thought—the negative judgment, and unless it were valid
thought would be impossible ; also its contradictory is incon-
ceivable. Moreover, apart altogether from the question as to
whether origin affects validity, in as much as the Principle
of Contradiction is involved, and in fact used, in the very
firBt negative judgment that we make—and even this judg-
ment must mean something—it would hardly seem to be the
result of experiment, as Mr. Schiller asserts, or of experience,
as Mr. Husik would put it. Indeed, both the Pragmatist and
Empirical account of its origin appear to me to be due to an
ignoratio elenohi. Mr. Schiller tells us that " the Principle of
Contradiction may be taken as simply the negative side of
that of Identity; " 1 and the Principle of Identity is under-
stood by him to affirm " the persistence of Identity through
change " ;2 so that the Pragmatist formulation of the Principle
of Contradiction must be somewhat as follows: " A thing
must be capable of excluding whatever threatens (the per-
sistence of) its identity (through change) ".* But this is
certainly not the Principle which we claim as an axiom or
self-evident truth. The axiomatic and traditional Principle
of Contradiction says nothing at all about persistence or
change. It restricts itself to one and the same moment of
time. It is quite probable that belief in the persistence of
objects through change is due to experience and experiment,
but this belief is a very different thing from our belief that an
object cannot at the same time and in the same sense be and
not be.
Nor is Mr. Husik's attack on the axiomatic nature of the
Principle any more to the point. For, convinced that it is
learnt oy experience, he -prefers to enunciate it in his own
way, viz.: " A thing cannot have at the same time what
experience finds it cannot have at the same time ".* To the
principle as thus enunciated, I am disposed to object in the
first place, that experience alone is incapable of finding what
an object can or cannot have at the same time. Experience,
in the sense in which Mr. Husik appears to be using the word,
can tell us what things do or do not have at the same time,
but questions as to possibility or impossibility are of a higher
order than mere experience. In the second place, granted
that belief in incompatibility does arise whenever two or more
1
' Axioms as Postulates,' Personal Idefilitm, p. 106.
'Ibid., p. 98. 3 Ibid., p. 106.
4
'Aristotle and the Principle of Contradiction,1 MIND, N.S., 58, p. 215.
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qualities are found never to co-exist, yet this incompatibility
is between positive qualities, while the Principle of Contra-
diction assertB incompatibility between affirmation and denial,
or between the positive idea ' being' and its corresponding
negative 'not-being'. A certain amount of experience is
doubtless wanted before we recognise that white objects can-
not at the same time be red ; but we recognise that the state-
ment ' This is not X ' means precisely the opposite of the
statement ' This is X ' and the consequent incompatibility of
the two statements, contemporaneously with the first intelli-
gent use of negation.
The principle of contradiction is based, therefore, on the
nature of affirmation and denial, and would thus seem to
belong primarily to the logical order. But this does not
make it merely subjective, for it is also based upon certain
facts of the objective order. Negation itself presupposes
that objects are limited, one having or being what another
has not or is not; for, otherwise, there would be nothing to
deny. Negation, in fact, would be impossible unless (1) there
were relatively independent objects (or at least qualities),
each having a certain determinate nature of its own; and
unless (2) these objects differed from one another; and (3)
it were possible to get to know their respective natures.
Since then the principle of contradiction presupposes Nega-
tion, it presupposes indirectly these objective facts, and so is
capable of an objective or ontological interpretation. Yet,
though the statement that ' the same thing cannot at same
time be and not be' has meaning, it is really only the
objectification of the principle that it is impossible intelli-
gently to affirm and at the same time to deny. Such terms
as 'not-being,' 'nothing,' 'unreal,' 'impossible,' are not
true concepts; for, in abstraction from their positive corre-
latives, they have no meaning. They signify merely the
negation of the corresponding positive terms objectified. It
is only in exceptional cases that we use them as subjects of
intelligible propositions, and when used as predicates, they
constitute in reality a negative judgment.
It will be interesting, if we may digress for a moment from
the problem before us, to compare the principle of Con-
tradiction with the so-called Principle of Identity. As tradi-
tionally enunciated, the Principle of Identity states that
' Whatever is, is ' . But how this enunciation is to be de-
fended against the charge of tautology—if taken, as the
words naturally imply, in the objective sense—I have never
been able to see. Moreover, as this Principle claims to be
a Law of Thought, it should, as a 'Law,' state a relation
23
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350 LESLIE J. WALKEB :
between different things, and, as a ' Law of Thought,' be ex-
pressed in logical terms. If, on the other hand, we interpret
the principle to mean that ' Everything has a determinate
nature,' or, that there is such a thing as ' Identity in Differ-
ence," ' this again is hardly a law of thought; nor is it any
longer the complement of the Principle of Contradiction, as
it purports to be; for the latter is a necessary law, or a law
stating a necessary connection between things, whereas the
Principle of Identity, if such be its meaning, is merely
' positive'. Again, if we say that " it is possible to make
judgments that have a meaning and are true,"1' though we
have now a statement about a process of thought, yet, again,
the law, so stated, is little more than descriptive, and seems
to belong to the psychological, rather than to the logical
order; for, unlike the Principle of Contradiction and all
other logical laws, it has no normative application as a guid-
ing principle of cognitive operations. It seems to me, there-
fore, that the Principle of Identity has no claim to be
regarded as a logical principle at all, nor indeed as a law in
the same sense that the Principle of Contradiction is a law,
unless we take it merely as another way of expressing the
Principle of Contradiction itself, viz., that what objectively
is, cannot be treated in thought as if it were not.
So far we have discussed only one kind of necessary in-
compatibility, that which holds between affirmation and
denial. But there are other kinds. Many positive qualities
never co-exist in the same object; and repeated experience
of this fact generates in us the belief they are incompatible.
Is this incompatibih'ty a mere fact, or is it a necessity?
Must we, in the case of these positive qualities, be content
with mere empirical knowledge, or can we go further and
attempt to explain their apparent incompatibility? Con-
tradiction undoubtedly involves incompatibility; is it equally
true to say that incompatibility involves contradiction ?
That incompatibility does involve contradiction, and is
therefore a necessity and not a mere fact is what we have to
prove, if we are to establish Leibnitz' assertion that simple
ideas are never incompatible; for his a priori proof, as it
stands, is hardly convincing. And I think that it can be
proved, for it can be shown in many cases that of incom-
patible qualities one is implicitly the negation of the others,
aud hence of necessity cannot belong to the same object.
Aristotle treats incompatibility under the name of ' Op-
position,' and it will be convenient, in further discussing its
1
 Bosanqnet, Logic, voL iu, p. 808. ' Ibvl^ p. 207.
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nature, to use his classification. " Things are said to be
opposed to one another in four ways; as Relatives, as Con-
traries, as Privation and Possession, and as Affirmation and
Denial. For example, the double and the half are opposed
as Relatives; bad and good as Contraries; blindness and
sight as Privation and Possession; ' He is sitting' and ' He
is not sitting' as Affirmation and Denial." '
The opposition which exists between Affirmation and
Denial is expressed in the Principle of Contradiction, and of
this we have already treated. It may, as we have seen, and
as Aristotle himself points out, be taken in an objective as
well as in a purely logical sense. Not only is ' He is sitting'
opposed to ' He is not sitting,' but the objects to which the
predicates ' sitting' and ' not-sitting' refer, are also opposed.3
Of the four kinds of Opposition, we are told in the Meta-
physics that Contradiction is the ' first'—a term which from
the context evidently means the most fundamental, or that
on which the other forms are based.3 The passage is thus
commented on by Aquinas : " Of these four kinds of opposi-
tion the first is contradiction. And the reason is this, that
contradiction is involved in all the others as something more
fundamental (prius) and more simple. For it is impossible
that opposites of any kind should exist together in the same
object, and this is due to the fact that one opposite by its
very nature implies the negation of the other."4
That the second kind of opposition can be reduced to the
first requires little proof. " For privation means either the
complete incapacity to possess Ca certain attribute), or the
non-possession of an attribute which a thing is naturally
fitted to possess, the one being complete privation, the other
privation that is in some way limited."0 In fact, privation
m general is defined as ' negatio in aliquo subjecto'. Where-
fore the opposition of privation and possession is, as Aristotle
Bays, a kind of contradiction.
The reduction of contraries to contradiction, on the other
1
 Xfyrrcu Si trtpor fripff dmict~ur6cu nrpaxat, f) i f rit npoi r», fj at ra
•itamla, f\ at (rripijo-tt rat «£tr, ^ its Kara(pa<Tts ical dnocpatns. Aristotle,
•Categories, c. 10.
3
 as yap TTOTf f] KtmitpatTis rrpos TTJV dvo<fKuriv drriKftrai, oiov TO Ka&rjrai
ru ov Kadrp-ai, ovru cat rb ixjt iKartpov vpay/ia arriKfinu, rd tadrprflai rtp
fir] Ka&rjfrdai. Ibid.
*TOVTW 8c vparor avrf^ Mwcr. Arid. Metaph. (Leipsic edition, lib.
ix. (r.), c 4, p. 200). Compare n-pinj Si <rarrtWif *(it ual aripjfvis (ibid.),
where again nparrq is used in the sense of the most fundamental, or that
from which all other forms are derived.
4
 Comiixentarin in Arid. Metaph., lib. x., lect. 6.
5
 Metapli., lib. ix. (x.), c. 4, pp. 200, 201.
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hand, is by no means so simple a matter, since contraries
admit of a mean, whereas contradiction does not The diffi-
culty is, however, only apparent and will admit a satisfactory
explanation. In the first place, it is always possible to find
some larger class to which a given pair of contraries belongs.
Contraries, in other words, are of the same genus, and in it
they are ' maxime distantia' {wkeltrrov huufr&peiv). " Tor,
since things that differ may differ to a greater or less extent,
there will always be a greatest difference and this I call
Contrariety."' Contraries thus constitute the two extreme
differentiae of a given genus, between which there may be
many 'means'.*
In the second place, the differentiae of a genus may be
regarded as giving fuller meaning or fuller reality to the
genus which they differentiate, inasmuch as they enlarge or
perfect the generic notion by the addition of other notes.
One of the extreme differentiae or contraries will thus give to
the genus its highest or final perfection; for instance, the
genus animal reaches its highest perfection in the human
organism. Taking, then, this perfection as an ideal standard,
we may arrange the other- differentiae in a scale according to
the degree in which they approach this ideal.1 We shall thus
have a maximum and a minimum, the maximum being the
ideal perfection itself, and the minimum the limiting case
where there is a natural aptitude in regard to the perfection
in question, but no proximate disposition or approach towards
its realisation. These maxima and minima are the contraries,
and are said to constitute the first differences of the genus,
because we may consider the ' means' as arising from their,
combination in various proportions.
Hence, we may regard a differentia in two ways, either as
a specific difference which gives a certain determination or
form to the genus and so constitutes the species; or as a
mere stage in a process which has for its end the realisation
of a certain ideal perfection. It is in this second sense that
the extreme differentiae are contrary to one another. For
" the contrariety existing between the differentiae of a genus
1
 There is one exception: ' corruptible' and 'incorruptible' are con-
traries, bnt do not fall under any of the ' summa genera' or categories-
mentioned by Aristotle. They are said ' per He dividere ens '; and so,
like the categories themselves, they are not predicable anivocally of ens.
That they are mutually contradictory, however, is evident from their
form. Of. Metapli. ix. (x.), c 10.
' Ibid., c. 4.
3
 This ' ideal' perfection according to Aristotle and Aquinas seems to
have been regarded as the greatest act mil perfection, so that for him
contraries constitute the greatest cdmtl difference.
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is considered according to the common principle upon which
contrariety is based, namely, excellence and defectY. Thus
contrariety involves intensive quantity. And this applies not
only to the extremes but also to the ' means'. In fact, any
pair of differentiae may be regarded as contraries relative to
those differentiae which lie between them. Every differentia,
then, has a certain intensive quantity which will depend
upon the degree in which it realises the ideal perfection of
the maxima differentia. And it is on account of this intensive
quantity that the incompatibility of positive qualities arises.
Here for the third time, therefore, we come across that
fundamental characteristic of individual objects which we
found to be presupposed by the possibility of negation and of
contradiction, viz., limitation. This limitation may be either
qualitative or quantitative ; but in a sense all limitation in-
volves quantity. An object may be limited in that it has
certain qualities whereas others are absent, and it may also
be limited in that it has these qualities only in a certain de-
gree ; both of which cases imply quantity, though in a dif-
ferent way. Moreover, our knowledge of objects includes
the knowledge of their limitations. We do not study things
in isolation; we compare them; and so learn that then-
qualities are limited both in number and degree; and this
limitation is implied in the definition which we may give
of them.
Thus all definition has a negative as well as a positive
aspect. We mean by a man, a cow, a newspaper, a triangle,
objects having (1) certain qualities, and not others; and (2)
a certain degree of these qualities, and no more. Now, either
an object has a certain quality or it has not. If, then, by
calling it a cow we affirm certain qualities of it, and by call-
ing it a horse we implicitly deny them, we have contradicted
ourselves. Again, either an object has or it has not a certain
determinate degree of some perfection. If, then, red implies
one degree of this perfection and blue another, red and blue
are mutually contradictory and for this reason incompatible ;
since by predicating one degree of a perfection we implicitly
deny any other. It is only between contraries as contraries
that there is a mean, in as much as it is possible that an
object may have neither the maximum nor the minimum of
the quality in .question. But, in so far as it has a certain
degree of that quality, it cannot have at the same time any
other degree In other words, when we have determined the
degree of perfection which an object has in the genus to
1
 Aquinas, Comtiuni. in Arid. Phytic*. lib. v., lect 3.
2 3
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354 LESLIE J. WALKER :
which it belongs, to assign to it any other differentia of that
same genus would involve contradiction. The same thing
can belong to one species only. Hence, all the differentiae of
a genus are necessarily incompatible, and this incompatibility
is based on the Principle of Contradiction.
It remains to confirm this law by a few examples before
passing on to a brief consideration of the fourth kind of in-
compatibility, that between relatives. Positive incompati-
bility is found to hold chiefly between the sensible quali-
ties of objects. Hot and cold, hard and soft, rough and
smooth, we infer from sense-experience to be incompatible.
Each of these pairs of opposites, moreover, belongs to the
Bame genus, and between them there are means, so that they
are contraries. Thus, temperature, hardness, and roughness,
vary in intensive quantity and admit of degree. Again, tem-
perature is due to molecular movements varying in length;
hardness to resistance varying in intensity; roughness and
smoothness to the spatial arrangement of the resisting points,
which may be at a greater or less distance from one another
on a given surface. Hence the incompatibility of different
degrees of heat and coldness, roughness ana smoothness,
hardness and softness, respectively, is explained by the fact
that each pair of contraries and the means lying between
them involve different intensive quantities of the same funda-
mental property or quality. Thus, their incompatibility is
based upon contradiction ; and this conclusion, inferred first
of all from perceptual data, is confirmed by our knowledge
of the objective nature of the qualities perceived.
The incompatibility of tastes and odours would seem to l>e
due to a similar cause; for we find contrast, compensation
and degree in sweetness, saltness, acidity, bitterness, as well
as in various smells. As, however, there is no satisfactory
classification in smells, and even in taste it is impossible as
yet to arrange the four primary taste-qualities in pairs so as
to form a scale, the incompatibility which they evince cannot
actually be reduced to contradiction ; though from the data
above-mentioned, the inference as to the nature of their
incompatibility is at least probable.
In treating of colours we are on surer ground. In spite of
the fact that introspective data present many difficulties, and
have given rise to several different theories, yet even our
present knowledge, imperfect as it is, affords a striking con-
firmation of the theory we have been advancing. In the first
place, there are complementary colours and their mixtures,
giving us graduated series; red through white to green,
yellow through white to blue, white through grey to black.
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Then there is the spectrum, where the positive colour qualities
arrange themselves in a scale according to their refractive
indices. Finally, there is the undulatory theory of light,
which reduces colours to different rates of vibration and
different lengths of ether waves, as in the case of heat.
All this is so much evidence pointing to the conclusion that
different colours are but different intensive quantities of some
fundamental quality or mode of motion. True, the subjective
data and the physical theory are not yet completely co-
ordinated, but both show at any rate this, that colour involves
quantity or degree—a fact which in itself is sufficient to prove
that contradiction is the basis of the incompatibility of colours.
I might add indefinitely to the examples I have chosen, for
if contraries are the first specific differences of a genus, there
will be as many pairs of contraries as there are genera, and
in each case the incompatibility of two or more attributes will
result. But the principle involved and the method of reducing
the incompatibility to contradiction will be the same. Let
us proceed, then, to consider relative opposition.
" Things which are relatively opposed are said to be what
they are on account of their being opposites, or on account of
their being in some way different from one another " ; ' in
.other words, it is precisely on account of the relation holding
between them that they get their respective names. Thus,
a man is said to be a ' father' in reference to something othei
than himself, and on account of a certain relation other than
that of identity, holding between himself and that other thing,
his ' son'. The same may be said of the correlative ' son,'
and similarly for other pairs of relatives, e.g., the ' double '
and the ' half.' Since, then, " things that are relatively
opposed are said to be what they are in reference to other
things, or on account of their relation to other things,"2
the incompatibility of relatives is only a special case of the
incompatibility of relations in general.
How does this incompatibility of relations arise ? Things
are said to be related in virtue of their attributes; thus, one
book is ' like ' another in virtue of its colour, or its binding,
and ' smaller ' than another in virtue of its extensive quantity
or size. These attributes, moreover, on account of which the
relation is predicated, are not considered in isolation, but in
comparison with an attribute of some other thing. A relation
1
 5<ra jiiv oir i f ra trpdr n dirurftrat, avri avtp t'crr't TO>» avTi*ti)iira»
Xiytrm rj 6-rraxrovr nWajs irpbt aura, olo» T6 im\a<nov, avr6 ontp tori*,
irinov 8*irXci<rio» Xiyirtu • ruiiis ytip iirr\airtor. Arist-, C'"**/., c. 10.
* oaa ovv drriVorat ut ri npot TJ, airra avtp iirr'iv iripat Xiytrai fj
6n»<r6iftroTf «p6c aXXijXa \iyertu. Ibid.
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is essentially a irpos n tr^eVt?, a reference of one thing to
another, and the relation is predicated or said to exist in virtue
of certain attributes belonging respectively to the two things.
The attributes on account of which the relation is predicated
are, therefore, essential to the relation. Change either of them
and you change the relation, which depends for its existence
upon their being what they are. And conversely for a new
relation to be predicable or for a given relation to change, the
terms must change.
Let us suppose now, that two different relations are pre-
dicated as holding simultaneously between two objects. If
the attributes in virtue of which these relations are predicated,
and in virtue of which they differ, are incompatible, the
relations also will be incompatible Incompatibility of rela-
tions thus arises from incompatibility of attributes. But the
incompatibility of attributes is due, as we have seen, to some
kind of quantitive incompatibility, and so is reducible to con-
tradiction. Hence the incompatibility of relations and of
relatives is also reducible to contradiction.
Thus, for material things to occupy different places, or to
be of different sizes and shapes at the same time, is impossible,
because in each case extrinsic or intrinsic space-relations are
involved ; and space-relations imply quantity, since they imply
that given points in the object in question are at certain
definite distances from an indefinite number of other points
within or without the object, distance being measured by
extensive quantity. Again, to say that ' A is the father of B,'
and at the same time ' the son of B,' is implicitly a contra-
diction, as may be shown in several ways. For instance,
both A and B are individuals occupying a determinate place in
the time-series and in the natural order. This time-6eries
may be represented by a line, part of which corresponds to
the life of A and part to the life of B ; the line, moreover,
being such that, at any point X, it will be divided into two
parts, antecedents and non-antecedents (or consequents).
Now, the assertion that' A is the father of B,' fixes the point
X, and determines A (in virtue of part of his life at any rate)
as an antecedent, and B as not an antecedent, and, in this
sense, the opposite or contradictory of A; and the statement
that ' B is the father 6i A,' or ' A the son of B,' would reverse
the respective positions of A and B in this time-series. B
would now be an antecedent, and A not an antecedent;
which is evidently a contradiction of what was involved in
the previous statement that ' A was the father of B '.
We have now discussed under the four headings'suggested
by Aristotle, the various kinds of incompatibility of which
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we have experience. Two of these, affirmation and denial,
possession and privation, are obviously contradictory in nature.
Oar belief in the other two, the incompatibility of contraries
and of their means, and of relatives, on the other hand, is
based primarily on the fact that such attributes and relations
never co-exist. And though from non-co-existence we cannot
legitimately infer incompatibility, it would appear, never-
theless, that this quasi-instinctive belief of mankind is not
fallacious. For, while positive qualities, and the relations
which depend upon them, are not incompatible in so far as
they are positive, yet, since they are limited both in number
and degree, and limitation always has a negative implication,
this incompatibility does of necessity arise. Incompatibility
thus involves and can be reduced to contradiction.
The theory of incompatibility upon which Leibnitz bases
his Ontological Argument would, therefore, seem to be valid.
Between positive qualities as such, incompatibility cannot
exist. Positive and simple attributes, unless they are " cir-
cumscribed by limits," and so in a sense negative as well as
positive, are always compatible. " Ea quae non sunt opposita,
possunt simul existere in eodem."l
But, having granted the validity of this theory, are we
forced to accept the Ontological Argument itself as valid?
Whatever our ultimate decision may bs, there are several
objections which demand consideration. I shall deal with
them under three heads. In the first place, it is often said
that the Ontological Argument involves an illicit transition
from the ideal to the actual order; secondly, it may be ob-
jected that existence is not a predicate; and, thirdly, it may
be urged that we have all along been dealing with ' created '
perfections, and that we cannot infer from the compatibility
of these to the compatibility of the attributes of God—and
this IB the only objection which seems to me to be of any real
force.
1. In regard to the alleged illicit transition from the ideal
to the actual, it would seem that although in general ' a
posse ad esse non valet illatio,' this dictum does not apply to
the case of God. If we define God as the ' Necessary Being,'
there can be no question of an illicit transition ; for the con-
cept of what is possible (can be), and at the same time is
necessary (cannot not be) must be objectively valid, otherwise
the concept would be contradictory. But, suppose we define
God as an Infinite Being, or a Being who comprises in Him-
self all simple perfections in an infinite degree, is the infer-
1
 Aquinas, Comment, in Metaph., lib. x., lect 10.
2 3 *
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ence ' a posse ad esse' equally valid ? Does Infinity imply
Necessary Existence ? Leibnitz speaks of God indifferently
as an Infinite Being and as a Necessary Being; and the two-
terms are really equivalents. For an Infinite Being cannot
receive His existence from anything else, since His infinity
excludes the possibility of anything else existing indepen-
dently of Him. In other words, whatever else exists must be
wholly dependent upon Him for its existence, and so cannot
give Him existence. An Infinite Being, therefore, must
exist ' a se,' of itself ; that is, its existence must proceed from
itself and be necessarily involved in its other attributes, which
are such that it cannot not exist. Hence, if God is possible,
He exists. But, in proving the possibility of God, we must
not forget that the existence which we predicate of Him, is
Necessary Existence or Self-sufficiency, and the possibility of
this must be shown. The question as to how far we have-
proved the possibility of God in this sense, I shall discuss
under the third objection.
2. Mr. Russell admits that on the analytic theory of neces-
sary judgments, Leibnitz' argument proves that God, as
defined by Leibnitz, is possible. But he objects to the Onto-
logical Argument itself, which is involved in saying that,
since existence is a perfection, God exists. " This," he says,
" depends upon regarding existence as a predicate, which
Leibnitz does," . . . whereas " he ought to have arrived at
Kant's position that existence is not a predicate, and that
God's non-existence cannot be self-contradictory." 1
Personally I must admit that the Kantian argument re-
garding existence as a predicate does not convince me. I see
no objection to admitting that " a hundred thalers which I
merely imagine," are not " exactly like a hundred thalers-
which really exist". For, to predicate existence of them,
though it does not change their essential nature, yet makes a
real difference in the idea which I form of them. ' Existence '
has meaning. ' Existing things' are not the same as ' things
in the abstract'; they have a power of affecting me and my
consciousness in a way which is impossible to things that do-
not exist. Consequently the addition of the idea of ' exist-
ence ' to the idea of ' thalers' gives the latter a meaning
which they had not before. My idea of ' existing thalers'
and my idea of ' thalers in the abstract' are not exactly
alike.
3. Since, then, existence has meaning, and since we do not
actually predicate it intelligently, I am disposed to admit
1
 The, Philiuopliy of Leibnitz, Russell, p. 174-5.
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that it is a predicate. But, on the other hand, existence,
when predicated of God, is predicated in a different way to
that in which it is predicated of anything else. Of God, we
predicate ' Necessary Existence,' while of other things we
predicate only ' contingent existence '. And the two kinds of
existence, or the two ways of predicating existence are only
analogous; i.e., we cannot in the strict sense of the words
make existence a genus of which ' necessary' and ' contin-
gent ' are the differentiae.
Now, all that our argument as to the nature of Incompati-
bility has proved, is that ' contingent existenoe ' is compatible
with simple attributes such as we know them in rerum natura:
or, granting that it is possible to regard existence in abstrac-
tion from its necessity or its contingency—that ' existence in
the abstract' is compatible with such attributes. But this is
insufficient for the purpose of the Ontological Argument.
God is essentially a Necessary Being, and npon this depends
the validity of the major : ' If God is possible, He exists'.
Hence, to prove that God is possible, we must show how
existence is implied in His other attributes, or—to put the
same thing in another way—we must prove that Necessary
Existence is compatible with these attributes: for it makes
all the difference to the validity of our argument whether the
existence we predicate is necessary or not.
This our theory of incompatibility certainly does not prove.
Moreover, another difficulty of a similar kind suggests itself.
We have been dealing throughout with beings that are both
contingent and limited, and have shown that, when their
attributes are incompatible, they involve contradiction; and
hence we have inferred that simple and positive attributes as
such cannot be incompatible. But are the simple qualities
which we have examined, at all comparable with the attri-
butes of God ? At best the comparison is only that of
analogy. And though the proof may hold in regard to all
simple natures as such, and although simple natures as such
are not limited in degree, yet the analogy weakens the argu-
ment when it is applied to attributes predicated of God.1
Again, the attributes with which we have been dealing are of
1
 The assertion of analogy does not mean that there is no similarity
between contingent perfections and the attributes of God, or that the
former are not truly manifestations of the latter. But the attributes of
God are not separable in kind ; they are all involved in His Deity ; so
that contingent perfections, such a* goodness and wisdom, are not pre-
dicable of God in the same sense that they are predicable of creatures,
but only in an analogous sense. Yet it is neverthe'eis true that " by an
accumulation of such analogous predications we approximate towards
the ever unattainable comprehension of Deity ".
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the physical order, and, even granting that we may legiti-
mately infer the nature of incompatibility, so demonstrated,
to be universal, yet it will be by no means an easy task to
«how that moral attributes, such, for instance, as Justice and
Mercy, are not mutually contradictory. And further, granted
that Justice is the truest Mercy, and that other moral attri-
butes are similarly compatible, we have still to show that
the predication of these attributes is not a contradiction of
the Unity of God. How is the synthesis of all thsse attri-
butes in one Being possible ? We cannot say. The theory
of Incompatibility that we have been advocating, does little
more than show that the compatibility of God's attributes
cannot be disproved. It is sufficient merely to throw the
onus probandi on an opponent.
Thus Leibnitz' view of the nature of incompatibility does
not seem to complete the Ontological Argument. It supplies
an obvious deficiency, but there is still something further
required, a step in the process of reasoning which has not
yet been proved, and wbich it would seem to be impossible
to prove without infringing upon the province of other argu-
ments. At the same time it will be admitted, I think, that
the famous proof of the Existence of God, when supported
by this theory of Incompatibility, if not conclusive, is at least
a Btrong presumptive argument well deserving attention and
having distinct religious value as a motive to belief. We
cannot, indeed, show a priori any necessary connection be-
tween God's attributes., yet the fact that even among con-
tingent existents, their " qualities are not, as in Bacon's
view, put together as ingredients are inserted to constitute a
dish, but are different aspects of one and the same central ar-
rangement,"1 would seem to point to a necessary connexion
and to mutual implication.
There are also other versions of the Ontological Argument
besides that of Anselm, Descartes, and Leibnitz. Nicholas
de Cusa, for instance, urges that, unless the concept we
form of Infinite Being is objectively valid, all knowledge and
all science is meaningless. For, " all things seek the same
which is something absolute ". The modern argument based
on the ideals of which we are conscious and on the need
which we feel of their ultimate satisfaction, is similar. Ex-
pressed in this form as a postulate for which we seek verifi-
cation, the argument has much more force, especially in the
philosophical atmosphere of the present day; for, unless these
ideals are realised somewhere, our nature and needs are
without meaning and without purpose.
1
 Venn; Empirical Logic, p. 82.
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To these and indeed to all proofs of the existence of God,
this theory of Incompatibility is, I take it, of value. For, to
many minds, the suspicion that the simple and infinite attri-
butes under which God is conceived may be incompatible,
suggests that our conception of Him, so far from being real,
is impossible; and that hence, all arguments advanced to
prove His existence are worthless; while the synthetic theory
advocated by Mr. Russell, contains an implicit difficulty in
regard to the Unity of God ; since, if I have understood Him
aright, it involves a fundamental Duality, two systems of
being or beings specifically and essentially incompatible, and
of which there cannot possibly be a single common Ground.
If, on the other hand, we grant that incompatibility is du&
to contradiction, and that contradiction presupposes negation,
and negation objects limited in nature, objections against
attributes that are not limited in nature but infinite, cannot
be urged on the ground of any incompatibility, such as we-
can conceive. This view is, I think, in harmony with that
of modern Hegelians, though I have considered it from the
Realist rather than from the Idealist standpoint. Mr.
Bradley tells us that there are ' no native contraries' or
incompatibles. " Things are contrary (incompatible) when,
being diverse, they strive to be united in one point which in
itself does not admit of internal diversity."1 He adds, how-
ever, that " conjunction and contradiction in short is but our
defect, our one-sidedness, and our abstraction, and it is
appearance and not Reality". Here I must beg to differ.
Of the nature of conjunction and Compatibility, of the
problem as to how different qualities can belong to the saute
object, I have said nothing; but, in my view, though there
are no native incompatibles, yet incompatibility and contra-
diction are both founded in Reality, viz., in the reality of
limited objects, dependent on God, but relatively independent.
of one another.
1
 Bradley, Appearmttt and Reality, p. 672.
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